Zano Forum

Hi there, After deploying your asset, use mint_asset if you need more supply later (up to your max), and assets_whitelist_add so it shows up in wallets, since Confidential Assets aren't visible by default. Beyond that, the key question is what the token is actually for (private stablecoin, community token, tokenized asset, etc.), since that drives everything else. Valorization: there's no built-in mechanism that gives a token value. Like any asset, value comes from utility (what can holders do with it?), adoption, and liquidity (can people actually trade it?). Price: Zano doesn't set or manage it. It's pure market discovery through trading: Zano Trade DEX: post/take buy and sell orders, price is whatever the order book agrees on Exchange listings: you can list your asset on CEXes and DEXes to have plenty of exchanges available If you want an active market, you'll likely need to seed liquidity yourself by posting the first buy/sell orders on Zano Trade. Some do it via trading bots. Good luck!

@fbirde Thanks for clarifying. Since this thread is specifically about Zenith, your broader concerns about Proof of Stake are certainly relevant. I was the one who introduced the post-quantum dimension because Zenith itself will eventually need to operate under different cryptographic assumptions. Recent theoretical advances have substantially reduced the estimated quantum resources required to solve the elliptic-curve discrete-logarithm problem on comparable 256-bit curves. That does not mean that a practical attack exists today, but it does reduce the planning margin available for redesigning, reviewing, deploying and completing a protocol migration. There is also a broader and worthwhile question about which consensus model is better suited to the quantum era. My own view is that a private Proof-of-Stake system such as Zarcanum and Zenith may ultimately be better positioned than Proof of Work, provided that its ownership, authorisation and eligibility mechanisms are migrated in time. That comparison probably deserves a separate thread of its own. Ideally, HF7 should already introduce hybrid authorisation. At minimum, it should establish the transaction formats, wallet support and architectural boundaries required for an orderly post-quantum transition, rather than leaving Zano to improvise an emergency migration later.

@acf Hi there, which events are you referring to?

@fbirde That is a separate and interesting debate, but it falls outside the scope of this post. The question addressed here is whether Zano can complete an orderly post-quantum transition in time — before the failure of its current cryptographic assumptions turns a planned migration into an emergency.

One of the things that matters for any crypto ecosystem is having places where the coin can actually be used, not just held. That’s something we’ve been working on with ZanoX. ZanoX is built around the Zano ecosystem and currently gives users several ways to use ZANO from one platform. You can buy or sell ZANO through crypto to crypto swaps, use crypto to purchase gift cards, and participate in on-chain prediction markets covering sports and real-world events. There’s no account creation required, and users remain in control of their own wallets rather than depositing funds into a traditional platform account. What interests us most is expanding the practical side of the Zano ecosystem. As Zano itself continues to develop, there should also be more things people can actually do with ZANO. We’d be interested to hear from the Zano community: What kind of utility would you most like to see built around ZANO next? ZanoX: ⁠zanox.io

Here are the FAQ around how the censorship resistant bridge operates: https://www.freedomdollar.com/en/faq#bridge

I'm not convinced yet that this forum site is legit. Seeing same user account (kwibs) from zanobay. Just trying to get confidence and be assured of legit site to discuss my zanobay transaction failure (funds sent & received, but no email after).

I may have just been scammed by this but finding it difficult to discuss it anywhere. Zanobay.com doesn't provide a support link or offer specifics on a transaction, such as the peer or other party providing the gift card. I have an order #, transfer showed complete but I got no email to tell me how to obtain the gift code. I should know better. I have used trucador in the past but every time I had to report an issue before the gift card was issued, plus it wasn't the easiest / smoothest process to use so I searched for alternatives and zanobay (which I thought was zanopay, as in cake wallet's "cakepay". Usually I send a small about first but I didn't in this case and it may have cost me 1.3 grand.

Zarcanum’s Economic Fog: Why It May Slow the First Quantum Attacks — but Cannot Make Zano Quantum-Resistant Introduction Discussions about quantum attacks on blockchains often assume a simple transition: One day elliptic-curve cryptography is secure; the next day every vulnerable key can be broken immediately. The real transition may be much less abrupt. The first quantum systems capable of running Shor’s algorithm against production elliptic-curve cryptography are likely to remain scarce, expensive and operationally constrained. Even after the first successful cryptographic breaks, an attacker may be able to recover only a limited number of private scalars within a useful period. This distinction matters. A quantum adversary with abundant capacity could eventually process enormous parts of a blockchain, recover private scalars from public curve points, reconstruct historical transaction relations and attack every remaining classical output. A resource-constrained adversary must instead choose: Which public keys should be attacked first? Zarcanum may give Zano an important advantage during this initial phase. Zarcanum is not post-quantum cryptography. It does not remove Zano’s dependence on elliptic-curve discrete-logarithm hardness. However, it conceals much of the economic and transactional information an attacker would need to allocate scarce quantum resources efficiently. This article refers to that effect as economic fog. The expression does not describe a formal cryptographic security property. It describes an operational obstacle: the attacker can see many public cryptographic objects, but cannot easily determine which ones contain the greatest accessible value. That distinction may create meaningful initial quantum friction. It must not, however, be confused with genuine quantum resistance. 1. The quantum problem begins at the output level A private Zano output uses a one-time public key of the general form: [ P=xG ] where: (P) is published in the blockchain; (x) is the one-time private scalar controlling that particular output; (G) is the elliptic-curve base point. The user’s permanent wallet address is not written directly into the output. This is a major privacy property: different incoming payments do not publicly expose one reusable receiving identity. But address privacy and output custody are different properties. If an adversary can solve the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem, it can recover: [ x=\log_G(P) ] The attacker does not first need to discover the permanent wallet address. It does not need the private view key, the permanent spend key or a previous staking event. The published output key itself contains the relation that becomes invertible under Shor’s algorithm. Therefore: Zarcanum outputs are not quantum-safe merely because their owners and amounts remain hidden. Every unspent classical Zano output ultimately depends on the continued exclusivity of its one-time private scalar. 2. What Zarcanum actually hides Although Zarcanum does not remove the vulnerable public-key relation, it changes the information environment surrounding it. A normal Zarcanum-era output does not publicly reveal, in directly readable form: its amount; its asset type; the permanent wallet that received it; which other outputs belong to the same holder; whether it represents a large or insignificant part of a wallet; or whether it later participated in staking. Zano’s confidential transaction system combines several mechanisms: one-time destination keys; confidential amount commitments; blinded asset tags; ring-based anonymous authorization; key images for double-spend prevention; and proofs connecting ownership, amount, asset type and validity. Zarcanum extends this private output domain into proof of stake. A participant can prove control of an eligible native-asset output and satisfy the staking condition without publicly disclosing the selected output or its amount. The result is not that the public key disappears. The result is that the attacker sees: [ P_1,P_2,P_3,\ldots,P_n ] without an obvious public ranking such as: [ P_7 = 250{,}000\ \text{ZANO} ] [ P_{31} = 0.8\ \text{ZANO} ] [ P_{82} = \text{another confidential asset} ] For a classical observer, those economic distinctions remain hidden. For a quantum attacker whose available executions of Shor are still limited, that uncertainty matters. 3. The attacker’s targeting problem Suppose an early quantum adversary can recover only a relatively small number of elliptic-curve scalars per day or per month. The attacker must estimate the expected return from targeting a public output: [ \text{expected return} \text{probability that it is unspent} \times \text{expected value} \times \text{probability of successful exploitation} ] Zarcanum makes each factor harder to estimate. Is the output still unspent? In a transparent UTXO system, the active unspent-output set can be directly enumerated. In a ring-signature system, the blockchain publishes a set of candidate outputs for each spend and a key image derived from the real input. Under classical assumptions, observers cannot determine which ring member generated that image. A quantum attacker can resolve the ambiguity, but doing so may itself require quantum work. For a candidate output: [ P_i=x_iG ] the attacker can recover (x_i), calculate the corresponding key image relation and compare it with published key images. If a match exists, that output was spent. If no match exists, it may remain unspent. But an attacker with limited Shor capacity may have spent one of its valuable computations merely to discover that the chosen output is already obsolete. Historical ring anonymity would eventually collapse under sufficiently broad discrete-logarithm recovery, but this does not mean that every ring can be resolved without cost during the first phase. How much value does it contain? Zarcanum-era amounts are hidden inside commitments. A simplified Pedersen commitment can be written as: [ C=aH+fG ] where: (a) is the amount; (f) is a random blinding factor; (G) and (H) are public generators. Even if a quantum adversary learns the discrete-logarithm relation between the generators, the published commitment does not necessarily reveal one unique historical amount. Many amount-and-mask combinations may correspond to the same point. This is an important nuance. Breaking elliptic-curve discrete logarithms may destroy the binding property of the commitment, threatening balance proofs and monetary integrity, without automatically revealing every historical amount in a unique and convenient form. Thus, an attacker may recover the one-time spending scalar of an output and still have lacked a reliable public estimate of its value before committing resources to the attack. What asset does it contain? Zano supports confidential assets through blinded asset tags and associated proofs. An ordinary observer cannot simply sort all outputs into: ZANO; fUSD; another confidential asset; or a negligible-value token. A complete failure of the underlying curve assumptions would threaten the soundness and binding of those asset relations. But again, total failure of integrity does not necessarily imply that every historical asset label becomes immediately and uniquely readable. For a selective attacker, uncertainty about the asset further reduces the value of blindly choosing a public output key. Does it belong to an important holder? A normal Zano wallet does not publicly expose one stable balance-bearing account. Outputs belonging to the same wallet are designed not to be trivially grouped. A large holder may therefore be represented by many apparently unrelated outputs whose combined value is not publicly visible. The attacker may see millions of public points while lacking a reliable way to say: These 27 outputs together belong to one holder controlling 400,000 ZANO. That is the core of the economic fog. 4. Zarcanum adds friction at more than one stage The protection is not a single obstacle. It appears at several stages of the attack. Target discovery The attacker cannot easily rank all private outputs by amount or wallet balance. Spent-output classification Determining whether an output remains live may require recovering its scalar and testing its key-image relation. Historical reconstruction Following the ancestry of a wallet may require resolving rings repeatedly across multiple transactions. Successor identification A transaction can produce more than one output. Even after identifying the true spent input, determining which new output carries forward the target’s value may require additional wallet information, later transaction analysis or further quantum work. Current-state maintenance If an output is consumed legitimately before the attacker completes the theft, its recovered private scalar no longer controls the current value. The attacker must locate and attack the successor. This can occur through an ordinary transaction or when an eligible output actually wins a Zarcanum staking event and is consumed and recreated. This renewal effect should not be exaggerated. Only outputs that are actually spent or selected successfully for staking are replaced. Many outputs may remain unchanged for long periods. Nevertheless, against a slow and selective adversary it adds another source of possible wasted effort. 5. Limited Shor capacity does not mean a partially broken key The expression “limited quantum attacker” needs precision. Shor’s algorithm does not normally return half of a usable private key. Either the discrete logarithm is recovered successfully or it is not. The limitation lies instead in throughput: how many logical qubits are available; how deep and reliable the quantum circuit is; how long one computation takes; how frequently it can be repeated; how many machines can operate in parallel; and how many attacks can be completed before defenders react. The relevant early scenario is therefore not “partial Shor” in the mathematical sense. It is: Successful Shor computations, but only against a limited number of selected public points. Economic fog is most valuable in exactly that scenario. If the attacker can process every public point on the chain cheaply, target selection no longer matters. 6. Three possible stages of quantum pressure The decline of Zarcanum’s passive protection can be understood in three broad stages. Stage 1: Selective quantum attacks The attacker can recover only a small number of private scalars. It will prefer targets that are: publicly identified; known to contain substantial value; known to remain active; and simple to exploit. Ordinary private Zarcanum outputs may be unattractive because the attacker cannot easily determine their economic value. Transparent accounts, public treasury wallets, known service reserves and old outputs with visible amounts may be selected first. At this stage, Zarcanum’s economic fog may provide substantial passive protection. Stage 2: Analytical quantum attacks The attacker can process larger numbers of outputs and ring members. It begins to: resolve historical rings; calculate candidate key images; distinguish spent from unspent outputs; follow selected transaction lineages; group activity using external metadata; and attack known wallets systematically. The fog begins to thin. Private outputs remain harder to analyse than transparent balances, but the attacker can now invest enough resources to reconstruct selected portions of the ledger. Stage 3: Industrial-scale curve compromise The attacker can process large fractions of the chain or routinely recover the secrets behind all relevant elliptic-curve relations. At this stage: one-time output secrets become recoverable at scale; historical ring members can be identified; key-image privacy collapses; Schnorr- and CLSAG-family proofs lose their classical security basis; Pedersen commitments lose binding; confidential-asset proofs may become forgeable; and private staking eligibility becomes vulnerable. The economic fog no longer provides meaningful custody protection. Zano must then be considered fundamentally compromised unless value and consensus have already migrated to cryptographic constructions based on independent post-quantum assumptions. 7. Important exceptions to the fog Not every Zano wallet receives the same passive protection. Auditable wallets A public tracking mechanism can identify a wallet’s balance and history without exposing its classical private spending key. This transparency is useful for accountability, but it also helps an attacker locate the wallet’s relevant outputs. The development fund is the clearest example. Its live balance and public auditability remove much of the target-selection uncertainty that protects an ordinary private wallet. Exchanges, bridges and custodians Large services may be identifiable through: published addresses; operational wallet patterns; deposits and withdrawals; internal leaks; regulatory disclosures; or infrastructure compromise. Zarcanum protects on-chain privacy, but it cannot erase information revealed outside the chain. Legacy outputs Pre-Zarcanum outputs with explicit amounts are easier to value. Most economically active holders appear likely to have migrated to Zarcanum-era outputs, particularly because only the new output domain participates in current private staking. But dormant, abandoned or lost legacy outputs may remain. Those outputs could become attractive early targets because their value is visible and their owners may no longer be capable of reacting. Known individual wallets A private wallet loses part of its economic fog when an adversary possesses: its tracking information; exchange records; compromised wallet metadata; address correspondence; or reliable knowledge of its output set. Zarcanum provides on-chain opacity, not immunity from external operational intelligence. 8. Why Zarcanum is still not quantum-resistant The strongest possible misunderstanding would be to conclude: Because Zarcanum hides the attacker’s best targets, Zarcanum protects funds against Shor. It does not. The public one-time output relation remains: [ P=xG ] The authorization system still depends on elliptic-curve secrets and proofs. The confidential-value system still depends on commitments whose binding relies on unknown generator relations. The anonymous-spending system still depends on ring and key-image relations whose security assumes discrete-logarithm hardness. The private staking system composes: output ownership; anonymous membership; confidential amount proofs; native-asset proofs; key-image or linkability relations; and block authorization. These mechanisms form one deeply connected elliptic-curve domain. Zarcanum extends classical privacy into consensus; it does not create a cryptographically independent post-quantum layer. Therefore, economic fog can change: the order of attacks; their cost; their expected profitability; and the time required to map the ledger. It cannot change the final mathematical result once curve discrete logarithms become routinely solvable. 9. Passive friction should accelerate migration, not delay it The possible advantage of Zarcanum is strategically valuable precisely because it may buy time. That time could be used to: define cryptographic-domain versioning; introduce hybrid protected outputs; create wallet migration and recovery tools; protect the development fund and other known reserves; coordinate exchanges and custodians; test new transaction formats; and begin replacing the private cryptographic domain in stages. A first hybrid custody mechanism does not need to recreate the whole of Zarcanum immediately. It could introduce a new output type requiring: [ \text{classical authorization} \land \text{independent post-quantum authorization} ] An adversary who later recovers every associated elliptic-curve scalar would still be unable to spend the migrated output without the independent post-quantum secret. This would protect custody while research continued into the harder problems: post-quantum unlinkable reception; anonymous authorization; double-spend nullifiers; confidential commitments; range and balance proofs; confidential assets; and private proof-of-stake eligibility. The economic fog should therefore be treated as a migration window, not as a substitute for migration. 10. The strategic opportunity for Zano Zano may occupy an unusual position during the first stage of the quantum transition. Compared with transparent blockchain systems, it can be difficult to rank its private outputs by value. Compared with much larger privacy systems, it may offer a smaller total economic reward to an attacker. Compared with large ecosystems, it may also have fewer exchanges, custodians and wallet implementations to coordinate during migration. These factors do not guarantee safety. A state actor, hostile laboratory or strategic adversary may choose Zano for reasons unrelated to immediate profit. The development fund and other known institutional wallets remain obvious targets. A hidden attacker may also possess information unavailable to public observers. But Zarcanum may still alter the economics of the earliest attacks enough to create a valuable interval in which Zano can act. The critical question is not whether the fog will last indefinitely. It will not. The question is: Can Zano use the period in which quantum attacks remain selective and expensive to migrate economically important value before attacks become broad and routine? Conclusion Zarcanum does not make Zano post-quantum secure. Every classical output still publishes an elliptic-curve one-time public key. The authorization, ring, commitment, confidential-asset and private-staking systems remain dependent on mathematical assumptions that Shor’s algorithm is designed to defeat. But this is only half of the strategic picture. Zarcanum conceals the information a resource-constrained attacker would normally use to select targets: output values; asset types; wallet groupings; staking-output identity; and much of the transaction lineage. This creates an economic fog around ordinary private outputs. During an initial period of scarce Shor-capable resources, that fog may increase the cost of reconnaissance, cause attackers to waste computations on spent or low-value outputs, and direct their attention toward clearer and more profitable targets. That is meaningful passive resistance. It is not durable cryptographic resistance. The correct conclusion is therefore: Zarcanum may slow the first selective quantum attacks, but only a migration to independent post-quantum authorization can protect Zano once elliptic-curve compromise becomes scalable. The time potentially gained by Zarcanum should not be used to postpone the transition. It should be used to make the transition possible before the fog begins to disappear.

This post examines a narrower question than whether quantum computers will eventually threaten elliptic-curve cryptography: Has the combination of Microsoft's 2029 roadmap and recent reductions in the quantum resources required for elliptic-curve discrete logarithms made a cryptographically relevant machine by the end of the decade a credible planning scenario? The answer is still uncertain, but the possibility can no longer be dismissed as remote. What Microsoft has actually announced Microsoft has not announced that the current Majorana 2 processor will enter industrial production in 2029, nor has it published the number of logical qubits that its proposed 2029 machine will provide. Majorana 2 is a multi-tetron experimental device. Microsoft describes a tetron as a topological qubit built from two superconducting nanowires with Majorana Zero Modes at their ends. The four-qubit array shown in the Majorana 2 publication therefore represents four topological physical qubits, not four fault-tolerant logical qubits. This distinction is essential. A logical qubit is obtained only after quantum error correction and must remain reliable throughout a very long computation. Consequently, it is not valid to divide the logical-qubit requirement of Shor's algorithm by four and interpret the result as a number of Majorana 2 processors. What Microsoft does state is that Majorana 2 has improved qubit stability by approximately three orders of magnitude over its previous processor, with mean lifetimes around 20 seconds, operations on the microsecond scale, and an architecture intended to scale. On that basis, Microsoft says that it now aims to deliver a scalable and practical quantum computer by 2029. That is a roadmap target, not a declaration that ECC-256 will be breakable in 2029. However, it provides a concrete engineering horizon against which cryptographic migration lead times can be assessed. Microsoft's own earlier estimate for attacking P-256 Microsoft's Azure Quantum Resource Estimator previously evaluated a Shor attack against the P-256 elliptic curve. Under its predefined Majorana hardware assumptions, the estimate was approximately: Majorana, reasonable assumptions: 3.69 million physical qubits 8 hours Majorana, optimistic assumptions: 1.10 million physical qubits 4 hours These estimates were based on an older logical circuit and assumed gate and measurement times of 100 nanoseconds. They should not be treated as a prediction for Majorana 2. Microsoft now describes Majorana 2 operations as occurring on the microsecond scale, and the actual physical-to-logical conversion, logical error rate, code distance, magic-state production capacity and system architecture of a 2029 machine have not been disclosed. Nevertheless, the estimate is important for one reason: Microsoft itself has modelled an ECC-256 attack as a million-scale physical-qubit problem under a topological architecture, rather than as a problem requiring an astronomically larger machine. The logical-qubit requirement is falling The cryptanalytic side of the equation has changed materially during 2026. A March 2026 analysis of elliptic-curve cryptocurrencies estimated that the 256-bit elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem could be solved using either: fewer than 1,200 logical qubits and fewer than 90 million Toffoli gates, or: fewer than 1,450 logical qubits and fewer than 70 million Toffoli gates. The authors estimated minute-scale execution on a fast superconducting architecture with fewer than half a million physical qubits under their stated assumptions. Those physical estimates do not transfer directly to Microsoft's topological architecture, but they demonstrate that improved circuits can substantially reduce the cryptanalytic threshold. A further paper published in July 2026 reduced the width for a 256-bit prime-field curve to 835 logical qubits. This is a space-optimized construction and therefore involves a significant time/gate trade-off. It should not be interpreted as proving that any machine with 835 logical qubits can immediately break ECC-256. The machine would also need sufficient logical fidelity, circuit depth, non-Clifford operations, classical feed-forward and total execution time. The important trend is not one isolated number. It is the downward progression: approximately 2,124 logical qubits in the earlier estimate, then approximately 1,100-1,450, and now 835 in a space-optimized construction. Hardware roadmaps and attack algorithms are improving simultaneously. What can and cannot be inferred for Zano Zano uses Ed25519-domain elliptic-curve constructions rather than P-256 or secp256k1. The published figures above therefore cannot be copied directly into a Zano threat estimate. A defensible calculation would require a circuit and resource estimate specifically adapted to the curve operations, coordinate system, error-correction model and hardware assumptions relevant to Ed25519. However, Ed25519 is not outside the scope of Shor's algorithm. It relies on the hardness of an elliptic-curve discrete logarithm over a prime field of comparable security scale. It is therefore reasonable to expect the required resources to be in a broadly comparable class, while leaving the exact count as an open technical question. For Zano, the consequence is more direct than a conventional on-spend attack against a temporarily exposed public key. Every private or legacy UTXO publishes a one-time output public key of the form: P = xG where x is the one-time private spending key. If an adversary can solve the discrete logarithm on the curve, the attack is: x = log_G(P) The permanent wallet address may remain hidden, but the individual output can lose custody security. The attacker does not need to wait for the owner to spend the output or reveal a permanent public key. Historical unspent outputs are already available for precomputation and prioritisation. This means that faster blocks or shorter confirmation times under Zenith do not remove the underlying exposure. They may improve the response window for some transaction-race scenarios, but they do not protect a public one-time output key whose secret can be recovered directly. The appropriate conclusion The evidence does not justify the statement: Microsoft will break ECC-256 in 2029. It does justify a more careful statement: A fault-tolerant machine of the scale Microsoft is targeting for the end of the decade may fall within the resource class required by increasingly efficient attacks against 256-bit elliptic curves. This remains conditional on unresolved factors: the number of usable logical qubits; the physical-to-logical overhead; logical error rates and code distance; gate and measurement speed; magic-state production throughput; system interconnection and control; the runtime of the selected attack circuit; and the exact resource requirements for Ed25519. The probability is not established. The planning consequence is clearer. A post-quantum migration for Zano requires architectural design, implementation, independent review, testnet operation, wallet changes, backup changes, service integration and enough time for users to migrate economically significant value. Beginning that work only after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer has been demonstrated would be too late, because existing output public keys are already on-chain. For planning purposes, 2029 should therefore be treated as a conservative engineering boundary, not as a predicted break date. A concrete question for the Zano roadmap The most useful immediate step may be to commission or reproduce a Zano-specific quantum resource estimate covering Ed25519 and the principal Zano relations built upon it. At minimum, it should distinguish: logical-qubit width; Toffoli or T-gate count; circuit depth; physical-qubit requirements under several error-correction models; expected runtime under fast and slow hardware clocks; and the difference between recovering a one-time spending key and attacking the wider Zarcanum/Zenith proof system. Such an estimate would not solve the transition problem, but it would replace broad analogy with a measurable threat model and help determine how much of the post-quantum groundwork must be incorporated into the HF7/HF8 architectural cycle. My present assessment is therefore: It is not confirmed that Microsoft's proposed 2029 machine will be able to attack Ed25519. However, given the scale Microsoft is targeting and the reduction of published ECC-256 attack estimates to approximately 835-1,450 logical qubits, that possibility is no longer remote enough to justify postponing Zano's post-quantum preparation until after 2029. References Microsoft Quantum, "Majorana 2 – Microsoft's Scalable Quantum Processor With Reliable, Long-Lasting Qubits" https://quantum.microsoft.com/en-us/insights/blogs/majorana-2-scalable-quantum-processor Microsoft Quantum, "Calculating resource estimates for cryptanalysis" https://quantum.microsoft.com/en-us/insights/blogs/resource-estimation/calculating-resource-estimates-for-cryptanalysis Babbush et al., "Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations," arXiv:2603.28846 https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846 Luo et al., "Quantum Algorithm for Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms with Space-Efficient Point Addition," arXiv:2607.13816 https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.13816

Mistex.io is a privacy-focused instant exchange built for fast, simple crypto swaps without unnecessary exposure. The platform does not require KYC or registration and do not keep user activity logs, so users can swap assets with fewer data trails. For stronger network privacy, Mistex also provides a Tor v3 mirror. On top of that, the website includes an encrypted in-house online chat, giving users support without relying on third-party tracking widgets. [image: 1784735250074-mistex-16x9-6.png]

LTC next? BCH? Any roadmap

The updated roadmap is ambitious, and the Zano Execution Layer could eventually add substantial utility to the ecosystem. My concern is not its potential value, but the order of priorities. The published roadmap does not yet appear to reflect the recent change in the post-quantum planning environment. Following Majorana 2, Microsoft now aims to achieve a scalable quantum computer by 2029. Separately, Executive Order 14412 has made post-quantum migration a current United States engineering programme, with a federal pilot due by the end of 2027 and migration deadlines for high-value and high-impact systems in 2030 and 2031. None of those dates proves that Ed25519 will be broken in 2029, 2030 or 2031. They do, however, show that waiting for a demonstrated cryptographically relevant quantum computer before beginning architectural preparation would be an unsafe strategy. Zano also has a specific custody exposure that should be distinguished from address privacy. Each unspent output publishes a one-time public key P = xG. The permanent wallet address may remain hidden, but if elliptic-curve discrete logarithms became tractable, the corresponding one-time spending secret x could be recovered directly from the output. Zenith's shorter block times and faster confirmations do not remove that exposure. I therefore believe that post-quantum custody and migration should become a core roadmap priority, particularly while HF7 and Zenith are still being prepared. The first objective need not be a complete post-quantum reconstruction of Zarcanum and Zenith. It should be a protected custody destination, probably beginning with a hybrid output requiring both classical and post-quantum authorization, together with wallet migration, backup and recovery support. This may require postponing lower-priority expansion work where it competes for the same core developers, wallet engineers, cryptographic reviewers, testing capacity or hard-fork coordination. The Execution Layer is the clearest example: it may be valuable later, but it does not protect existing Zano outputs or prepare the base layer for cryptographic migration. Projects developed by genuinely independent teams would not necessarily need to stop. The point is that base-layer custody and migration should take precedence wherever resources overlap. This is not an argument against Zenith. On the contrary, Zenith may be the best opportunity to introduce the versioning, migration paths and architectural separation required for an orderly post-quantum transition.

@htzano They could also break the rewards into fractions. If you do actions every 15 seconds instead of 60 seconds you divide the rewards by 4 so the same amount but more chances. I have no idea how that will work out. We are a ways away from it.

Proposal: A Post-Quantum Readiness Track for Zano and Zenith Purpose of this proposal This post expands on the suggestion that post-quantum readiness should become a core Zano roadmap priority. It is a planning proposal, not a claim that Ed25519 will necessarily be broken in 2029 or on any other specific date. It also does not attempt to select a final post-quantum signature, commitment scheme, anonymous authorization system or private Proof-of-Stake construction. The immediate question is narrower: What should Zano begin building now so that users have somewhere safe to migrate their value before elliptic-curve security becomes practically insufficient? A complete post-quantum reconstruction of Zano's privacy architecture will be a long research programme. The first deliverable should therefore be quantum-safe custody and a workable migration path, while the complete private post-quantum domain is developed in later stages. 1. Why this is now a roadmap issue The planning environment has changed materially. Microsoft states that, following Majorana 2, it expects to achieve a scalable quantum computer by 2029 and describes that target as commercially valuable. This does not establish that the resulting machine will be able to break Ed25519. It does, however, provide a reasonable conservative boundary for engineering preparation. The United States has also issued Executive Order 14412, directing an accelerated federal migration to NIST-approved post-quantum cryptography. It requires a NIST migration pilot to be completed by the end of 2027, post-quantum key establishment for high-value and high-impact federal systems by the end of 2030, and post-quantum digital signatures for those systems by the end of 2031. The lesson is not that a cryptographic break has been scheduled. The lesson is that migration has already become a current engineering programme for major public and private actors. For Zano, deployment lead time matters more than prediction. A safe transition requires: a complete cryptographic inventory and threat model; protocol and wallet design; prototype implementation and performance measurement; independent cryptographic and implementation review; testnet operation; new backup and recovery procedures; support from exchanges, custodians and hardware-wallet providers; user education; and enough time for economically significant value to be migrated. A privacy-preserving blockchain cannot safely improvise new ownership, anonymity, commitment and consensus proofs after the threat has already become practical. 2. The immediate Zano-specific custody problem Zano's permanent wallet address is not written directly into every output. This is valuable for privacy, but address privacy and quantum-safe custody are different properties. Each private or legacy UTXO publishes a one-time output public key of the form: P = xG where x is the corresponding one-time private spending key. Under current assumptions, recovering x from P is computationally infeasible. If elliptic-curve discrete logarithms became tractable, however, an adversary could derive: x = log_G(P) The attacker would not need the user's permanent spend key, private view key, published wallet address, prior staking activity or an already revealed key image. The output public key is already present in the ledger. This means that an unspent output may remain unlinkable to a known permanent address while nevertheless losing its custody security. The wider post-quantum problem is larger than this single relation. Zano's private domain also relies on elliptic-curve assumptions for ring authorization, key images, Schnorr-type proofs, Pedersen commitments, confidential assets and private staking proofs. Those mechanisms will eventually require coordinated replacement. Nevertheless, custody should be addressed first because it provides an achievable early objective: prevent an attacker who has recovered all elliptic-curve spending secrets from spending value that users have already migrated to a protected destination. 3. What Zenith changes — and what it does not Zenith is a major consensus redesign. Its epochs, slots, snapshots, randomness, probabilistic leader election, fork choice and faster confirmation model may provide substantial operational and security improvements. Those improvements do not, by themselves, make existing outputs post-quantum. Shorter block intervals and faster confirmations do not protect a public output key that has been exposed since the output was created. Zenith's slot-dependent ephemeral key images improve the classical privacy and freshness properties of staking, but they remain part of an elliptic-curve construction. The specified eligibility proof also composes one-time output control, anonymous membership, commitments, d/v-CLSAG, Schnorr proofs and range relations. A conventional post-quantum block signature would therefore be insufficient. It could authenticate a public validator, but it would not reproduce Zenith's private eligibility proof. This does not make Zenith the wrong priority. It makes Zenith the best architectural opportunity to prepare the transition. The high-level consensus semantics can be distinguished from their current cryptographic realization: Consensus semantics: epochs, slots, snapshots, randomness, eligibility conditions, fork choice and confirmation Cryptographic realization: output control, anonymous membership, nullification, confidential stake and threshold proof HF7 should make that boundary as explicit as practical, even though a complete post-quantum private eligibility construction will come later. 4. Central recommendation: custody and migration first The first post-quantum deliverable should not be a complete post-quantum version of Zenith, Zarcanum and Confidential Assets. It should be: A quantum-safe custody destination to which existing value can be migrated before elliptic-curve spending keys become practically recoverable. The complete transition can then proceed in dependency order: programme foundation and cryptographic inventory; quantum-safe custody and migration; post-quantum unlinkable reception; post-quantum anonymous authorization and double-spend prevention; post-quantum commitments, confidential values and assets; private post-quantum eligibility for Zenith; progressive restriction and retirement of classical-only outputs. This sequencing protects value early without pretending that an ordinary post-quantum signature recreates Zano's full privacy architecture. 5. Minimum viable hybrid custody output A realistic early measure would be a new, explicitly versioned hybrid output. The output would preserve the current classical objects needed for compatibility, while adding an independent post-quantum public credential. Spending would require both authorizations: classical authorization AND post-quantum authorization A simple logical OR would not be sufficient. If either branch independently authorized the spend, breaking the classical branch would still permit theft. The essential acceptance test should be deliberately severe: Assume that the attacker knows every elliptic-curve secret associated with the output. The output must still be unspendable without the independent post-quantum private credential. Existing outputs cannot receive this protection retroactively because they contain no post-quantum credential selected by their owner. Users would need an explicit migration transaction: existing classical output -> owner-authorized migration -> hybrid protected output The wallet would need to generate and back up the new keys, identify unmigrated value, construct migration transactions, verify that the protected output has been confirmed, and support recovery from the new backup format. The first hybrid output should be treated as a transitional custody vault, not as the final post-quantum private payment domain. To reduce schedule risk, it may initially: offer less spending anonymity than ordinary ZC outputs; be excluded from staking; use larger transactions; omit post-quantum confidential-asset functionality; and coexist with the current private domain rather than replace it. Those limitations must be explicit and voluntary. Preserving value should not be delayed until every current privacy property can be reproduced simultaneously. The precise construction, primitive selection and recovery policy require formal specification and independent review. A hybrid mechanism must also consider the possibility that an early post-quantum implementation is later found defective, so credential rotation and upgrade paths should be designed from the start. 6. Changes worth incorporating into HF7 Before HF7 formats and interfaces become difficult to change, Zenith development should be used to introduce the foundations of cryptographic evolution. 6.1 Explicit cryptographic-domain versioning Inputs, outputs, authorization proofs, nullifiers or key images, addresses and staking proofs should identify the cryptographic domain and version under which they are interpreted. Versioning should not be limited to a signature identifier. A future private domain may require different object types, scanning procedures, state-consumption identifiers, commitments and resource limits. 6.2 A new hybrid output type HF7 should leave room for a protected output that can coexist with current payment and staking outputs, even if the first version is not eligible for staking. 6.3 Native migration paths Migration should be a defined protocol and wallet operation, not a manual emergency procedure. Fees, change outputs, privacy consequences and domain conversion rules should be explicit. 6.4 Separation of consensus semantics from eligibility proofs The implementation boundary should minimise assumptions by the epoch, slot, snapshot and fork-choice logic about the internal form of a particular elliptic-curve proof. This will not make cryptography interchangeable automatically, but it can reduce the cost of integrating a future eligibility domain. 6.5 Capability negotiation Wallets, exchanges and custodians should be able to determine which address, output and authorization versions are supported before creating a transaction. 6.6 Emergency and retirement states The protocol should define in advance how it could: warn against new classical-only outputs; restrict their creation; suspend deposits to vulnerable formats; require protected destinations; and eventually retire classical-only authorization. Emergency rules designed during an incident are more likely to create consensus or custody failures. 6.7 Resource accounting by domain Post-quantum signatures and proofs may have very different bandwidth, verification, memory and storage costs. Fee and block-resource policies should be able to account for those differences explicitly. 7. Proposed roadmap reprioritisation The public roadmap currently places the Zenith testnet and the Zano Execution Layer mainnet in Q4 2026, with Zenith mainnet planned for Q2 2027. It also includes a new mobile wallet, a networking privacy upgrade, DEX integration research, alias markets, multisignature work, hardware-wallet support and other ecosystem projects. A genuine post-quantum programme does not require every other project to stop. It does require a clear rule: Base-layer custody and migration work should take precedence whenever projects compete for the same core developers, wallet engineers, cryptographic reviewers, testing capacity or hard-fork coordination. Priority A — Begin immediately cryptographic inventory and threat model; hybrid custody-output specification and prototype; wallet migration, backup and recovery; HF7 cryptographic-domain versioning; consensus/eligibility separation; independent cryptographic review; early exchange, custodian and hardware-wallet coordination. Priority B — Reorient or reuse current and planned work New mobile wallet: make migration, dual-key backup and domain support primary architectural requirements. Hardware-wallet support: design for both current and post-quantum credentials rather than completing a classical-only integration. Multisignature: redirect part of the work towards hybrid and threshold custody. Dynamic fees: expand the design into domain-specific resource accounting. Full-chain membership research: reuse the completed research, indexing and anonymity-set work, but evaluate post-quantum membership and one-of-many proof directions before committing further production work to the current algebraic domain. Grants: use part of the programme for targeted post-quantum research, benchmarking and external review. Priority C — Candidates for deferral The clearest candidate is the Zano Execution Layer. An EVM-compatible sidechain may eventually create substantial ecosystem utility. It does not protect existing Zano outputs, provide a migration destination or make the Zano base layer cryptographically agile. Its testnet, bridge, mainnet integration, contract environment, operational support and auditing can consume significant engineering and coordination capacity. Where those resources overlap, the Execution Layer should be deferred in favour of post-quantum custody. Other candidates include: alias markets and premium alias auctions; additional DEX integration research; non-essential bridge expansion; and other ecosystem functions that do not contribute directly to custody, migration or HF7 transition architecture. Projects built and reviewed by genuinely independent teams need not stop. The objective is not to centralise all development around one task, but to prevent expansion work from displacing base-layer security. 8. A compact staged programme The following schedule is illustrative rather than a fixed commitment. Stage 1 — Architecture and prototype: approximately 0–3 months complete the cryptographic inventory and threat model; define the hybrid-output security properties; evaluate candidate signature families and key sizes; prototype node verification and serialization; benchmark transaction size and verification cost; define wallet backup and recovery requirements. Stage 2 — Wallet and testnet migration: approximately 3–6 months implement output and input versions; implement wallet key generation and recovery; add migration transactions; test failure cases and chain reorganisation handling; perform the total-elliptic-compromise acceptance test; deploy an internal and then public testnet. Stage 3 — Independent review and mainnet readiness: approximately 6–9 months external cryptographic and implementation review; hard-fork and compatibility testing; exchange and custodian integration; hardware-wallet planning; activation, emergency and rollback procedures; mainnet release candidate. Stage 4 — Native post-quantum privacy: multi-year research and engineering unlinkable reception; anonymous authorization; post-quantum nullifiers; confidential commitments and range proofs; confidential assets; and private Zenith eligibility on the new foundation. 9. Non-goals and limits This proposal does not claim that: Ed25519 will be broken in 2029; Microsoft has published the resources required for a practical Shor attack against Zano; every historical amount or asset type will necessarily become uniquely readable; replacing one signature makes Zano post-quantum; Zano is uniquely vulnerable among elliptic-curve blockchains; Zenith should be abandoned; or privacy should be permanently sacrificed. It also does not select a final primitive family. The first public decision should concern architecture, threat model, acceptance criteria and migration order. Primitive selection should follow reproducible benchmarking, security analysis and external review. 10. Questions for the Zano team Is a post-quantum cryptographic inventory or transition architecture already being developed internally? Are the HF7 input, output and proof formats still open to explicit cryptographic-domain versioning? Could a hybrid custody output be introduced alongside Zenith while remaining initially ineligible for staking? Can the epoch, slot, snapshot and fork-choice implementation be separated more clearly from the concrete eligibility-proof verifier? Which roadmap projects actually compete for the same core developers, wallet engineers, auditors and release capacity? Would the team consider publishing a formal post-quantum threat model and migration requirements before selecting final primitives? Would external cryptographic researchers be welcomed for targeted review and prototype evaluation? Conclusion Zano has already demonstrated that it can introduce deep protocol changes while preserving chain continuity and protocol identity. HF4 and HF6 provide different precedents for the coexistence of new and historical domains. The next step should be to turn that evolutionary capacity into deliberate cryptographic agility. Zenith is not the obstacle. It is the opportunity to establish versioned domains, migration paths and a cleaner boundary between consensus semantics and cryptographic eligibility. The most urgent objective is not to complete every post-quantum privacy primitive at once. It is to ensure that users can move existing value into an output that remains secure even after complete compromise of the present elliptic-curve spending secrets. More detailed vulnerability and architectural analyses are being prepared separately. This post is intended to define the roadmap decision that should come first. References Microsoft — Introducing Majorana 2 The White House — Executive Order 14412: Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks Zano Roadmap Zano and Common Prefix — Zenith: Privacy-Preserving PoS Protocol, June 2026 Zano — Confidential Assets Scheme for RingCT and Zarcanum, version 1.1 CryptoNote — CryptoNote v2.0

Interview on Mike Adams show was my intro to Zano.

yeah for sure man this project just does not disappoint

and there it is what u were asking for @god check out the new road map